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I. Introduction 
The notion that homeownership contributes to social harmony and to individuals’ happiness and 
welfare is deeply rooted in the American psyche. Consequently, encouraging, subsidizing, and 
protecting homeownership are deeply ingrained in public policy. 
Under the assumption that we will continue to subsidize homeownership as a nation, this paper 
examines two broad classes of homebuyer subsidies that could be directed toward households 
with low-to-moderate income. More specifically, I focus on the effectiveness of the two main 
delivery mechanisms: interest-rate subsidies and down-payment assistance.  Our current tax 
regime already provides an interest rate subsidy to homeowners through the mortgage interest 
deduction.
1 However, this type of subsidy is unavailable to most lower-income households who 
take the standard deduction (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003).
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Earlier comparative research on subsidies emphasized their impact on affordability rather than 
their sustainability.  For example, the tenure-choice literature has found that many potential 
homebuyers are constrained by their lack of a sufficient down payment. Therefore, down-
payment assistance is more effective than interest-rate subsidies in influencing home-purchase 
decisions, not just here in the U.S. but also abroad (Gobillon and le Blanc, 2008; Hegedüs et al., 
2004; Quercia et al., 2000; also see Feldman, 2001 for a comprehensive review of the tenure-
choice literature). However, following the recent crisis, attention shifted from the purchase 
decision to the sustainability of homeownership. On this front, two questions need to be 
addressed: First, what is the impact of each type of subsidy on loan performance in low-to-
moderate-income (LMI) areas? Second, what is the cost of such subsidies to the taxpayer? 
  My focus in this paper will be a 
hypothetical interest subsidy program that targets solely low-moderate income households. 
On the first question, I find that a to achieve the same reduction in default risk from a one basis-
point decline in mortgage rates, LMI homebuyers would need a supplemental down payment of 
$32.  For example, a 25 basis point mortgage rate subsidy is equivalent to an $800 supplemental 
                                                           
1 Lower interest costs can also be achieved through FHA mortgage insurance funded by premiums paid by 
borrowers, although this does not constitute a subsidy if the insurance is properly priced. 
2 In 2007, tax payers reporting income below $50,000 (approximately the U.S. median income) received 4.1 
percent of the subsidy’s value, while those earning more than $100,000 received 73 percent of the subsidy 
(Ventry, 2009). 2 
 
downpayment in that they both reduce default rates by 19 basis points.  On the second question, I 
find that the total resources needed to enable all such borrowers to pay in an extra down payment 
are well below the cost of an interest-subsidy program over a 15-year period. In addition to lower 
costs, what makes the down-payment program attractive is that it would create a significantly 
larger number of new homebuyers compared to the interest-rate subsidy. Even after accounting 
for renters who become homeowners as a result of the downpayment subsidy, the cost of the 
down-payment program still trails that of the interest-subsidy program by more than 30 percent. 
But why would one expect one type of program to be better than the other?  The advantage of a 
down payment program is that it would provide higher homeowner equity.  Genesove and Mayer 
(1997) show that equity makes sellers more flexible in pricing, and reduces the time a house 
stays on the market.  For a homeowner who lacks any pricing flexibility because the mortgage 
exceeds the value of his home, the only way out of homeownership is to pay the difference to the 
lender or to let the lender take over the property with all the associated losses.  Simply 
subsidizing the mortgage rate does not provide the same benefits as a down payment.  A lower 
rate would surely make payments more affordable and lower the instance of defaults.  However, 
it may not permit an exit from homeownership that precludes default during bad times. 
The advantage of interest subsidies is that while every low-income homebuyer would receive 
down payment assistance at the time of the purchase, the benefit of a subsidized mortgage rate 
accumulates over time only to those who stay current on their mortgages; that is, the interest rate 
program is a contingent subsidy.  Whether the greater benefit of the down payment program or 
the contingent nature of below-market interest rates dominates in the end is an empirical 
question, which is addressed in this paper. 
As a final note, the cost of either subsidy to the taxpayer also depends on program parameters. 
Under the current housing finance policy, the interest-rate subsidy takes the form of a federal 
mortgage-interest tax deduction and its cost is fully borne by the taxpayer.  A program that 
targets low-moderate income households could also be designed as a tax expenditure or it could 
be similar to USDA Section 502 direct loans, which are loans with subsidized payments to rural 
households.  Down-payment assistance is provided at the local level through nonprofit 
organizations using a combination of public and private funds. In other words, while higher 3 
 
down payments do require larger resources at origination—compared to an interest subsidy 
disbursed over time—the full cost is not necessarily borne by the taxpayer.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it offers a way to compare alternative subsidy delivery 
mechanisms if we choose to preserve homeownership as a housing policy goal.  It is a first effort 
in addressing an important policy question with imperfect data. Consequently, the results come 
with many caveats reported in Section 5.  The remainder of the paper evaluates the subsidies. 
The questions of whether homeownership should be subsidized and, if so, by how much, are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
II. Data and Method 
In this section, I examine how homeowner subsidies affect loan performance and how much they 
cost. The primary data source is the LPS Applied Analytics’ loan-level mortgage-servicing data 
for loans originated in the 2002–04 period and tracked until December 2005. Two factors 
determine the choice of origination years. First, as Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) have 
documented, mortgage underwriting standards declined steadily over many years before the 
beginning of the crisis. After the mortgage market stabilizes, the terms and performance of the 
loans originated near the peak of the housing bubble are unlikely to be observed again. Based on 
this assertion, I exclude originations in the years 2005 and later. The second factor is data 
availability: The market coverage of servicing data is thin before 2003. Yet, given that the 
dataset is already limited to years 2004 and earlier by the first factor, I settle on 2002 through 
2004 as my preferred origination years. The observation period ends in December 2005 to 
dissociate loan performance from the last hurrah and the bursting of the housing bubble and the 
effects of the financial crisis. Admittedly, it is impossible to completely disentangle the effect of 
the crisis on loan performance and determine how the loans would have behaved in a “normal” 
market. I will discuss this issue in greater detail in the next section. 
There are 5,782,120 first-lien, home-purchase mortgages for owner-occupied properties in the 
sample. Keeping in mind that the cost of any program is a major issue, I restrict the availability 
of subsidies to zip codes with median family incomes that are below the national median 
($55,832), loan amounts below the FHA limit for low-price markets in 2005 ($172,632), and 
home values below the median home value in 2005 ($211,700). Obviously, these are subjective 4 
 
limits and not intended as a policy recommendation. With these restrictions, there are 2,776,072 
loans in the sample. 
II.a. Method 
The LPS Applied Analytics dataset contains information on loan characteristics at the time of 
origination as well as during the life of the loan (see table 1). Using these characteristics, the 
estimation strategy involves predicting the probability and timing of default over a 15-year 
period if interest rates are subsidized by 0.25, 0.50, 075 or 1 percentage point for LMI borrowers. 
Then, I estimate the amount of down-payment assistance that would produce the same default 
pattern as an interest-rate reduction. Given that both types of subsidies have the same default 
pattern, the second stage of the analysis involves estimating the net cost of the subsidies, taking 
into account not just the money that has to be spent but also the savings from lower losses. 
Loans disappear from the sample for three reasons: loan default, prepayment, or the servicer’s 
sale of servicing rights. I investigate default and prepayment with a gamma hazard model.
3
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 In the 
loan-default model, the hazard is defined as a delinquency period of 90 days or more. 
Prepayments and loans that are sold or outlast the observation period are treated as censored 
observations. In the prepayment model, the prepayment is the hazard; defaults and other loans 
are treated as censored observations. Both models have the form 
  (1) 
where Ti is the hazard time from origination and the x’s are the covariates defined in table 1. 
Table 2 presents the sample statistics. 
To estimate model (1) and predict the prepayment and default probabilities of the subsidized 
loans in the sample for each month, I split the sample into two groups, one for the estimation and 
one for the predictions. The estimation subsample consists of a randomly chosen one-third of all 
the loans, and the prediction subsample consists of the remainder.
4
                                                           
3 Data reject a proportional hazard assumption. The gamma model provides the best fit compared to other 
distributions as measured by the log-likelihood. 
 
4 Results are robust to differences in the way the sample is split for estimation and prediction. 5 
 
The subsidies are introduced to the prediction sample, either by reducing the loans’ interest rate 
(0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1 percent) or by keeping the interest rate at its original level but reducing the 
origination amount by a supplemental down payment that generates a default profile equivalent 
to that of the interest-rate subsidy. After the predicted default and prepayment probabilities are 
determined in each month, a random draw from a uniform distribution—with support over 
[0,1]—is used to determine whether a loan is prepaid, is in default, or survived the period. The 
prepayment and default behavior of the loans is predicted for 180 periods (through the end of 
2017), using their original characteristics as well as the subsidized loan terms. In a market that 
appreciated at its historic rate before the housing boom (the average of the 1980–2000 period), 
there was usually enough equity in the house after 180 periods to allow defaults without any loss 
to the lender. Each sample is simulated 100 times to obtain a distribution of outcomes. 
As mentioned earlier, events after December 2005 are excluded from the estimation sample. 
Default rates show a sharp increase in 2007 and 2008 for all origination-year cohorts. Survival 
models of any distributional form provide an extremely poor fit to the data. For example, 
predicted default rates in 2008 are about 6 percentage points above the actual default rates in the 
data. Note that the purpose of this paper is not to make accurate predictions about default rates in 
a crisis but to predict the effect of subsidies on default rates in a more “normal” market. So by 
ending the observation period in December 2005, I partly undo the impact of the crisis. Using 
this method, predicted default rates in 2008 are 1 percentage point below actual defaults.  
The data presents some unique challenges. The first is the large number of missing observations 
in some critical variables, which creates sample-selection issues. Missing values in borrowers’ 
debt-to-income ratios, credit histories, and completeness of loan documentation are of primary 
concern because of the obvious relationship between these variables and the loan’s survival 
probability. I deal with this problem by including an inverse Mill’s ratio for each of the three 
variables as a covariate. Each inverse Mill’s ratio,  ˆ
Y λ , is estimated from the following probit 
model, where Y is an indicator dummy for a missing debt-to-income ratio, a missing credit 







YY Xβ   (2) 6 
 
For the sake of brevity, I do not present these results, but I calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio as 
( ) ˆˆ ˆ () 1 () Y λφ =−Φ YY YY Xβ Xβ   (3) 
Proper identification requires finding instruments correlated with the missing observations but 
uncorrelated with the error term in the hazard model. Unfortunately, all variables in the LPS 
Applied Analytics dataset are chosen to capture factors that are relevant for the hazard rates. 
Consequently, I have to rely on functional form for identification. 
A univariate analysis of the data reveals that, on average, observations with a missing debt-to-
income ratio have smaller loan sizes, are less likely to have prepayment penalties or negative 
amortization, and are more likely to have a balloon payment than observations with valid data. 
Those with incomplete documentation have higher loan-to-value ratios and loan amounts but a 
lower likelihood of having a prepayment penalty, balloon payment, or negative amortization. 
Those with missing FICO scores are smaller in size and shorter in maturity. They are less likely 
to have a prepayment penalty or negative amortization but more likely to have a balloon 
payment. It is likely that these missing values are caused by a particular servicer’s not reporting 
these variables; unfortunately, servicer identity is not available in the LPS Applied Analytics 
dataset. XY includes the variables stated above for each Y. 
A second data challenge is the need to create a mortgage-rate history for every loan. The amount 
of the interest-rate subsidy in each month depends on the outstanding loan amount, which, in 
turn, depends on the history of mortgage rates. In the actual data, the rate history ends when the 
loan is prepaid or defaults. However, in the simulations, a subsidized loan is likely to survive 
beyond its actual survival time. This does not pose any problem for fixed-rate mortgages, but the 
series must be recreated for adjustable-rate mortgages using the base rate (such as COFI, COSI, 
prime rate, T-bill rate, LIBOR, etc.) and the mark-up, both provided in the LPS data. 
Observations with missing base-rate type are deleted. If the markup is missing, the observation is 
deleted unless the loan went through at least one rate reset and the markup can be deduced from 
the latest rate and the base rate. Forward-looking base rates are assumed to remain constant at 
their last actual rate. In other words, all mortgage rates are treated as fixed going forward. 7 
 
After accounting for all the missing data, there are 258,656 observations in the estimation sample 
and 517,311 observations in the prediction sample. 
Determining the default and prepayment paths of the loans in the prediction sample is the first 
stage of the analysis. The second stage is estimating the costs associated with the subsidies. The 
direct costs of interest subsidies and down-payment assistance are straightforward to calculate, 
given that the loan characteristics and the number of borrowers are known. The challenge is the 
estimation of the subsidies’ effect on loss in case of default. For that purpose, home values at 
default could be calculated using the appraisal value at origination, modified by the 
appreciation/depreciation rate of the Case-Shiller Home Price Index during the life of the loan in 
the state where the property is located. Moreover, the price received by the lender when the 
property is sold may be discounted by an additional 25 percent because the property is real-
estate-owned, and it takes a long time to sell a property in a down market (Pennington-Cross, 
2006, Campbell et al., 2010). The difference between the discounted price and the outstanding 
loan amount is the gain/loss to the lender. Unfortunately, this strategy confirms that the housing 
bubble masked potential losses from default, as one might expect. For example, there would 
have been no losses to lenders from mortgages defaulting in 2006, in the sense that home values 
were greater than the amount owed in almost all defaulting loans. To undo the effect of the 
housing bubble, I take the average state-level monthly appreciation rate in the 1980–2001 period 
and assume that this rate remains constant over time. 
There are also many effects of the crisis that I cannot disentangle from the mortgage 
performance. For example, interest rates declined to historically low levels following the severe 
recession, and adjustable-rate-mortgage borrowers benefited from the lower rates. What the rates 
would have been in the absence of the crisis is not an issue I deal with in this paper. 
As a final note, recall that the simulations are based on 517,311 loans totaling $54 billion. This is 
a miniscule number relative to the overall size of the market. The total size of the market (as 
reported by LPS Applied Analytics), including all loans with missing information, is $290.5 
billion. Furthermore, the LPS data captures only about one-third of the actual loans originated. 
For example, it reports $114 billion in purchase loans originated in the second quarter of 2003 
(including loans of all sizes in the entire country). In comparison, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association reports $344 billion in purchase originations in that same quarter. To capture the 8 
 
total market size, I assume that the loans missing from the sample are similar to those in the 
sample. Then, I augment my cost and loss calculations for each loan with a multiplier that 
reflects the true size of the origination market in the month of the loan’s origination relative to 
the size of loan originations in my sample in that month.  With this technique, I estimate that 
there would have been 11 million participants in the assistance programs in the 2002-2004 
period, with $1.1 trillion in total lending.  As mentioned earlier, the participation numbers are 
likely to be lower if the programs can be tailored more narrowly to the low-moderate income 
group than my sample allows. 
Details about the multiplier are in Appendix A.  All costs reported in the next section are the 
augmented numbers. The dollar amounts are in constant dollars, assuming a 2 percent inflation 
rate. 
III. Results 
Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates for the default and prepayment models, where the sign of 
the coefficient indicates the impact on survival probability. The coefficients of the default model 
have the expected sign. Higher interest rates, higher loan amounts (keeping appraisal value 
constant), lower FICO scores, adjustable interest rates, interest-only loans, lack of full 
documentation, and lower appraisal values are associated with lower survival rates. Similarly, 
prepayments are more likely if interest rates are high or variable, FICO scores are low, loan 
amount and debt-to-income ratios are high, and the loan is fully documented. Negative 
amortization loans, interest-only loans, and loans with prepayment penalties are less likely to 
prepay. 
Because the ultimate motive of supplemental down payments and interest subsidies is assumed 
to be the creation of sustainable homeownership, cost comparisons should be made after insuring 
that the outcomes are equivalent in terms of sustainability. In other words, long-term default 
outcomes must be the same. By equating the predicted December 2017 default rates in the 
interest- and down-payment-assisted pools, I find that a 1 basis point interest-rate subsidy is 
equivalent to a $32 supplement to down payments. Figure 1 shows the cumulative default pattern 
of the subsidized loans for different types and at different levels of the subsidy. The 180-month 
cumulative default rate is 11.5 percent in the unsubsidized pool, 11.3, 11.1, 10.9, and 10.7 9 
 
percent in the $800, $1,600, $2,400, and $3,200 supplemental down payment pools, respectively. 
The change in default rate from an additional $3,200 down payment represents 83,374 
households exiting the default state by becoming successful or prepaying. The next step is to 
calculate how much it costs to reduce defaults through interest rate or down payment assistance. 
The supplemental down payment required is the number of originations times the necessary 
amount per borrower. The cost of the interest-rate subsidy depends on how long the subsidized 
loans survive before being prepaid or going into default.
5
The two types of subsidy also differ in the loss suffered in the event of default. Because the loan 
amounts are smaller, down-payment-assisted loans will suffer smaller losses at the time of 
default. The loan amounts at default come from the simulations. Figure 4 shows the loss profiles 
in two subsidized samples: 0.50 percent, 1 percent and their respective down payment programs. 
At 0.5 percent, the losses in the interest-subsidy sample reach $5 billion, whereas the losses in 
the down-payment-assisted sample add up to $4.6 billion. Both compare favorably to losses of 
$5.6 billion that would occur in the absence of any assistance. If the interest subsidy is set at 1 
percent, the losses are $4.5 billion and $3.8 billion in the interest and down payment pools, 
respectively.  One must subtract the savings coming from reduced losses from the gross cost of 
the assistance programs when calculating the net costs.  For example, the $3,200 down payment 
assistance costs $35 billion and it saves $1.8 billion, or around 5 percent.  The net cost is close to 
$33 billion.  The cost of the $1,600 down payment program would be a net $16 billion rather 
than the gross of $17 billion. 
  Therefore, it is determined by the 
prepayment and default paths generated by the simulations (figures 1 and 2).  Figure 3 shows 
how the cost of each program varies at four different levels of assistance.  Their ratio indicates 
that the cost of the interest-rate subsidy relative to the down payment assistance increases at 
higher levels of subsidy.  To see why, one needs to recall the relative advantages of each type of 
subsidy.  As we have discussed, the advantage of down payment assistance is that defaults are 
more sensitive to down payments than to interest rates.  The advantage of the interest rate 
subsidy is that it is a contingent subsidy.  However, as we increase the level of the interest rate 
subsidy, not only the cost per individual goes up but fewer of them default as well; in other 
words more people receive a larger subsidy.  Therefore, the cost grows more rapidly. 
                                                           
5 The interest subsidy ends if the borrower refinances. It is assumed not to transfer to the new loan. 10 
 
At this point, down-payment assistance seems like the lower-cost program. However, in addition 
to reducing defaults, the subsidies also incentivize renters to buy their homes. Using the 
estimates of Linneman et al. (1997), a 1-percent interest-rate subsidy creates a 0.07-percent 
increase in the homeownership rate, which translates to 73,836 new homeowners. The $3,200 
down-payment assistance reduces the average loan-to-value ratio by 3.1 percent and creates a 
0.51-percent increase in homeownership rate or 541,627 new buyers. Assuming that the default 
and prepayment profiles, as well as the loss rates, for these new buyers will be identical to those 
for existing borrowers, the new buyers use up $297 million in interest subsidies or $1.6 billion in 
down-payment assistance. However, despite the large addition of new buyers, the down-payment 
program still needs 34 percent less resources. 
III.b. Robustness Check 
As mentioned earlier, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) have documented that mortgage 
underwriting standards declined steadily over many years before the beginning of the crisis. 
While I tried to eliminate most poorly underwritten loans by excluding originations after 2004, 
there may still be some loans, which may be deemed too risky to originate in the future.  I define 
these loans as loans with LTV and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios in the 99
th percentile of the 
sample; i.e., greater than 102 percent LTV and 67 percent DTI.  To examine what the interest 
rate – down payment trade-off would look like in the absence of such extreme loans, I repeat the 
analysis after deleting those observations. 
I find that the down payment assistance looks more attractive when the extreme observations are 
eliminated.  The trade-off improves from $32 to $30 for each basis point mortgage rate decline.  
The improvement is mostly due to the declining sensitivity of defaults to interest rates in the 
absence of potentially poorly underwritten loans.  The regression results and the cost analysis are 
omitted from the paper for the sake of brevity but are available up on request. 
Another factor that may have a significant impact on the results is the potential for nonlinear 
relationships in the data.  For example, the effects from downpayments might be close to linear 
because monthly payment is proportional to loan size, while effects coming from interest rates 
might be nonlinear because monthly payment is not proportional to interest rates.  A one percent 
decline in interest rates would have a much less significant effect on monthly payments at higher 11 
 
interest rates.  To capture this nonlinearity, I repeat the analysis by replacing Int.Rate with  
log(1+Int.Rate).  The regression results and the cost analysis are omitted from the paper but two 
findings are worth mentioning.  First, the logged interest rate model provides a significantly 
poorer fit to the data based on a comparison of log-likelihoods.  Second, the mortgage rate – 
downpayment trade-off deteriorates to $47.50 per basis point.  Despite this deterioration, the 
downpayment program is still five percent cheaper than the mortgage subsidy program.  
However, the second finding is suspect given the first finding.  An alternative specification that 
uses Int.Rate and its square also provides a poorer fit. 
IV. Policy Implications 
Two policy issues arise from this analysis. The first is whether or not we want to spend tens of 
billions of dollars to increase sustainability (or reduce defaults) by a fraction of a percentage 
point (the largest subsidy we considered, 1% - $3,200, reduces defaults by 0.75 percent). 
Assuming that this question is answered in the affirmative, the second issue is the funding 
options for the subsidies. As mentioned earlier, interest subsidies are currently funded through 
tax expenditures, but programs for down-payment assistance are funded through a mixture of 
public and private resources. I will assume that this structure will continue. In other words, 
interest-rate subsidies will continue to be paid entirely with tax money, while down-payment 
subsidies can be enhanced through private contributions. This is a sensible assumption, given the 
voluntary nature of private contributions. Interest-rate subsidies are disbursed over the life of the 
mortgage (although few mortgages are still alive after 15 years). Any private source would have 
trouble committing itself for such an extended period. 
One complication of down-payment assistance is that it adds to the homebuyer’s equity, so it 
could potentially be borrowed against by the homebuyer and spent on consumption instead of 
being a source of stability. There are ways to get around this problem—for example, by granting 
the assistance program a silent second lien on the property that is “talkative” enough to warn off 
home-equity-line-of-credit lenders but expires automatically if the homeowner stays in the house 
for a previously specified period. 
It is also worth noting that the down-payment supplement does not have to be entirely in 
“assistance” form. There are promising savings programs targeting LMI households such as 12 
 
individual development accounts (IDAs). These are savings accounts established with local 
financial institutions and managed by community organizations in the name of an LMI 
individual in order to encourage saving toward starting a business, paying for education or job 
training, or buying a home. IDA programs typically provide $1 to $3 in matching funds for every 
dollar saved by an individual participant. The matching funds come from public and private 
sources; the federal Assets for Independence program requires IDA sponsors to raise private 
funds to match the federal money. The match comes with some strings attached. For example, 
participants must save for a minimum length of time before they can withdraw their savings 
without losing the matching funds. They must also get training in financial literacy before they 
can use the money. More information about account features, participant characteristics, and 
findings from pilot programs can be found in Schreiner and Sherraden (2007). 
There is some evidence that IDAs encourage new savings, but the existing experimental designs 
are too weak to prove that the saving rate does indeed increase. Schreiner and Sherraden report 
that IDA participants in the American Dream Demonstration pilot program saved on average 
$558 over the life of the program (varied regionally, with a maximum of 4.5 years); this comes 
to a little more than $1,000 if matching private funds are included. But the authors also recognize 
that it is not clear how much of those savings came from the cannibalization of other savings 
accounts, such as retirement accounts. 
Still, if the numbers are reliable in terms of the actual additional savings they can create, such a 
savings program could potentially shave $11 billion (11 million borrowers at $1,000 each) from 
the cost of the down-payment program. 
V. Caveats 
This paper’s findings come with many warnings attached. First, as mentioned earlier, the housing 
boom and bust most likely reduced the occurrence of defaults—as well as the severity of losses 
in default—and increased the occurrence of prepayments. Even though my analysis left out most 
of the home price boom and bust, their impact will still be felt indirectly through the path 
followed by mortgage rates, for example. Therefore, the loss estimates should be interpreted with 
caution. 13 
 
Second, program costs can be significantly reduced by limiting the subsidies to first-time 
homebuyers. People who managed to buy their first home can most likely buy their next without 
assistance. However, first-time-buyer information is not available in the dataset, so alternative 
cost analysis is not available. 
Third, forecasting the default and prepayment paths of mortgages 15 years into the future, using 
three years’ worth of observed data, can be a stretch. Yet the choice is unavoidable, given the 
data problems described earlier. 
Finally, unlike down-payment assistance, which is disbursed at the time of purchase, the interest-
rate subsidy is disbursed over the life of the loan; i.e., it has higher duration.  Consequently, its 
present value is very sensitive to the choice of discount rate. Recall that the calculations so far 
assumed a discount rate of 2 percent.  At 4 percent discount rate, the net cost of the subsidy 
programs drops by about 4.4 percent.  Still, the decline is not sufficient to close the gap between 
the two programs. 
VI. Conclusion 
There is clear evidence that many low-to-moderate-income homebuyers are wealth-constrained; 
therefore, a dollar spent in down-payment subsidies is more successful at creating new 
homebuyers than a dollar spent in interest-rate subsidies. However, the recent crisis raised the 
important questions of whether these new homebuyers can actually remain homeowners in the 
long run and how much it costs to create successful new homeowners. This paper is an attempt at 
answering those questions. 
I find that a dollar spent on interest-rate subsidies is not only less effective at encouraging 
homeownership than down-payment subsidies, but also less effective at reducing defaults. While 
the cost estimates of this paper can be improved upon with better data over time, the findings still 
suggest that down-payment programs have a pronounced edge over policies that target interest 
costs. 
   14 
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Table 1 – List of Covariates 
Variable  Definition 
Int.Rate  The interest rate on the loan at origination 
FICO  Borrower's FICO score at origination 
IO  Interest-only loan indicator 
Fixed  Fixed-rate loan indicator 
Prepay  Prepayment penalty indicator 
Negam  Negative amortization indicator 
Full.Doc  Fully documented loan indicator 
LogAppraisal  Natural log of the appraisal value 
DTI.Ratio  Borrower's debt-to-income ratio at origination 
Term  The term of the loan 
Single.Fam  Single family home indicator 
LogOrig  Natural log of the loan amount at origination 
Convent  Conventional loan indicator 
Appreciate  Home price appreciation in the state in 1980−2000 
LogIncome  Median income of the zip code in 2000 
35 MONTH DUMMIES  A dummy that equals one in the month the loan was originated 
51 STATE DUMMIES  A dummy for each state where loans were originated 
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Table 2 – Summary Statistics (Selected Variables) (775,968 observations) 
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Int.Rate  6.09  0.94  6  1  16.13 
FICO  689  69  691  300  966 
Appreciate  1.48  0.54  1.36  0.57  3.93 
IO  0.02  0.15  0  0  1 
Fixed  0.81  0.39  1  0  1 
Prepay  0.13  0.33  0  0  1 
Negam  0.04  0.20  0  0  1 
LTV  86.24  13.35  89.89  0.01  192.28 
Full.Doc  0.72  0.45  1  0  1 
Appraisal  122,775  40,789  123,000  3,000  211,700 
LogAppraisal  11.65  0.38  11.72  8.01  12.26 
DTI.Ratio  33.07  13.10  33  1  99 
Term  29.02  3.70  30  0.5  80 
Single.Fam  0.77  0.42  1  0  1 
Orig  104,385  34,549  104,500  3000  172,632 
LogOrig  11.49  0.39  11.56  8.01  12.06 
Convent  0.67  0.47  1  0  1 
Income  40,124  8,301  40,000  3,750  55,821 
LogIncome  10.58  0.22  10.60  8.23  10.93 
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Table 3 – Hazard Regressions 
 
 
Default Model   
 
Prepayment Model  
 
Estimate  Chi-Sqr  
 
Estimate  Chi-Sqr  
Int.Rate  -0.112  278.3 * 
 
-0.068  1094.3 * 
FICO  0.006  2114.7 * 
 
0.001  392.7 * 
Appreciate  -0.223  1.1   
 
2.519  2163.4 * 
IO  0.071  1.2   
 
-0.072  45.8 * 
Fixed  0.185  78.5 * 
 
0.229  2072.9 * 
Prepay  0.057  2.2   
 
-0.012  1.1  
Negam  -0.752  217.7 * 
 
-0.057  18.9 * 
Full.Doc  -0.095  37.8 * 
 
0.079  467.1 * 
LogAppraisal  1.559  454.9 * 
 
-0.023  4.4  
DTI.Ratio  -0.003  34.7 * 
 
-0.002  168.4 * 
Term  -0.006  3.6   
 
-0.001  4.1  
Single.Fam  -0.045  6.4   
 
0.010  6.5  
LogOrig  -1.492  411.9 * 
 
-0.120  119.4 * 
Convent  0.006  0.1   
 
-0.040  87.4 * 
LogIncome  0.234  54.2 * 
 
-0.042  26.5 * 































* Significant at 1 percent. 
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Figure 1 – Estimated cumulative default rates of original and subsidized loans 
 
a. 1 percent interest vs. $3,200 down payment subsidy 
 
b. The sensitivity to down payment subsidies 










































































































































































Downpayment Subsidy ($3200)20 
 
Figure 2 – Estimated cumulative prepayment rates of original and subsidized loans 
  
a. 1 percent interest vs. $3,200 down payment assistance 
 

















































































































































































Interest Subsidy (1.00%)21 
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Figure 4 – Expected lender losses in foreclosure (present value) 
 
a. No Subsidy 
 
b. 0.5 Percent Interest-rate Subsidy  c. $1,600 Down Payment Assistance 
 
 
The dashed lines indicate the minimum and maximum losses in each period. 









































































































































































































































































































Appendix A – Market Multipliers 
The calculations for the monthly multipliers are shown in Table A.1.  For example, according to 
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), there were $217 Billion in purchase-mortgage 
originations in the first quarter of 2002 (column (5)).  In the same period, LPS reports $18 
Billion in purchase loans (4).  MBA does not report monthly origination numbers.  However, 
assuming that monthly originations in MBA are proportional to those in LPS (3), one can 
estimate the monthly originations in MBA (6). 
The next step is to calculate the amount of loans to low-moderate income (LMI) households that 
will be subject to the new subsidy proposal.  Recall that these are loans in zip codes with median 
family incomes below the national median ($55,832), loan amounts below the FHA limit for 
low-price markets in 2005 ($172,632), and home values below the median home value in 2005 
($211,700).  LPS reports $2 Billion worth of such loans originated in January 2002, $3 Billion in 
February, etc. (7).  The low-moderate income originations in January are 50 percent of the total 
originations in LPS in that month (8); February LMI originations are 49 percent of the total 
originations.  If the same ratios apply to MBA, then one would expect $28 Billion in total LMI 
originations in January and $35 Billion in February (9). 
Because I lose a large number of observations to missing data, the sample I use to estimate the 
cost of each type of subsidy and the mortgage losses in each pool is also very small.  Out of the 
$2 Billion in LMI originations in LPS in January, my sample contains only $0.168 Billion worth 
of loans (10).  Similarly, the February sample contains $0.369 Billion.  Therefore, I estimate that 
the actual market is 169.48 times the size of my sample in January and 94.87 times in February, 
etc. (11).  The cost and loss estimate for each loan is augmented by the multiplier of its 
origination month to estimate the full cost of the subsidies. 
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Table A.1. – Monthly Multipliers – All columns except (1), (2), (8), and (11) are in $Billions. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 










 LPS LMI / 
LPS Total  
MBA LMI 
Estimate  
LPS LMI Used 
in Analysis 
Multiplier 
2002  1   5      57  2  0.50  28  0.168  169.48 
2  6      71  3  0.49  35  0.369  94.87 
3  7  18  217  89  4  0.48  43  0.471  90.79 
4  7      85  3  0.47  40  0.491  80.90 
5  9      107  4  0.46  50  0.605  82.26 
6  10  27  315  123  5  0.44  54  0.696  77.15 
7  13      85  5  0.42  36  0.847  42.29 
8  16      108  7  0.40  43  0.994  43.22 
9  17  46  302  110  7  0.39  43  0.977  44.30 
10  21      90  8  0.37  34  1.141  29.60 
11  19      84  7  0.36  31  1.095  27.89 
12  21  61  263  89  7  0.35  31  1.158  26.68 
2003  1  15      55  5  0.34  19  0.491  37.70 
2  20      74  7  0.34  25  1.046  23.82 
3  28  63  230  102  9  0.31  32  1.237  25.77 
4  32      97  10  0.31  30  1.512  19.77 
5  37      113  11  0.30  34  1.728  19.48 
6  44  114  344  135  12  0.27  36  1.891  19.18 
7  45      144  12  0.27  39  1.901  20.31 
8  42      135  12  0.28  37  1.887  19.67 
9  33  120  384  106  10  0.30  32  1.802  17.51 
10  33      114  10  0.30  34  1.582  21.51 
11  28      97  8  0.29  28  1.683  16.45 
12  32  93  322  111  8  0.26  29  1.839  15.82 
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 










 LPS LMI / 
LPS Total  
MBA LMI 
Estimate  
LPS LMI Used 
in Analysis 
Multiplier 
2004  1  18      51  5  0.26  13  0.842  15.97 
2  29      82  8  0.26  21  1.574  13.53 
3  42  89  251  118  10  0.24  28  2.174  13.02 
4  46      119  11  0.23  28  2.231  12.42 
5  47      121  11  0.23  28  2.379  11.69 
6  54  147  379  138  12  0.22  31  2.561  12.03 
7  50      125  11  0.23  28  2.884  9.87 
8  50      125  11  0.22  28  2.554  10.83 
9  45  144  362  112  10  0.22  24  2.324  10.51 
10  45      106  10  0.21  23  2.198  10.35 
11  43      102  9  0.21  21  2.104  10.06 
12  46  134  317  109  9  0.20  22  1.262  17.48 
 